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Dec.1952] PROVIDENCE BAPTIST CHURCH v. SuPERIOR CT. 55 
[40 C.2d 55; 251 P.2d 10] 
[S. F. No. 18648. In Bank. Dec. 12, 1952.] 
PROVIDENCE BAPTIST CHURCH OF SAN FRANCISCO 
(a Nonprofit Corporation) et al., Petitioners, v. THE 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY 
OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent. 
[1] Religious Societies- Remedies- Prohibition.- Where the 
superior court had jurisdiction to determine whether a church 
had followed the procedure established by its usage, custom, 
rules and regulations in respect to its pastor's position, it had 
jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly what those usages 
and regulations were and the judicial process should not be 
halted by prohibition. 
[2] Appeal-Judgments Appealable.-No appeal lies from an inter-
locutory judgment. 
[3] Reference-Appeal.-No appeal lies from an order appointing 
a receiver. 
[4] Prohibition-Effect of Other Remedies.-Prohibition will not 
issue when there is another adequate remedy. 
[5] !d.-Acts Prohibitable-Complet.ed Proceedings.-A writ of 
prohibition ordinarily issues only to prevent the commission 
of a future act and not to undo an act already performed. 
[6] !d.-Adequacy of Other Remedies-When Appeal Inadequate. 
-A remedy by appeal from the judgment at the end of a trial 
is not adequate so as to preclude issuance of a writ of prohi-
bition, when the court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the 
action and no appeal is available before final judgment. 
[7] !d.-Adequacy of Other Remedies-When Appeal Inadequate. 
-Where an order is not appealable, but is reviewable only on 
appeal from a subsequent judgment, various factors, such as 
expense of proceeding with a trial and prejudice resulting 
from delay, may operate to make that remedy inadequate and 
prohibition a proper remedy. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Reference, § 18. 
[5] See Cal.Jur., Prohibition, § 3; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 47. 
McK. Dig, References: [1] Religious Societies, § 14; [2] Appeal 
and Error,§ 26; [3] Reference, § 24(2); [4] Prohibition, § 11; [5] 
Prohibition, § 6; [6, 7] Prohibition, § 14(2); [8, 9, 13-16] Religious 
Societies, § 11; [10] Religious Societies, § 3; [11] Religious 
Societies, § 13(1); [12] Religious Societies, § 1. 
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[8] Religious Societies-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts. 
-~-A~ long· as rh·il or property rights are involved, the eomts 
will enterbin jurisdiction of rontrover·sies in religious bodiPR 
11lthongb some eeelesiasti<'al matters an> ineidf'ntally invoh•f'rl. 
[9] !d.-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.-Civil and prop-
erty rights are involvPd so as to afford a basis for judicial 
interference in a church controversy where the real property 
of the church and funds collected are involved, and where a 
determination of who shall be pastor necessarily presents the 
question of who shall receive the emoluments of the office. 
[10] Id.-Incorporation.-A nonprofit corporation may be formed 
for religious purposes. (Corp. Code, § 9200.) 
[11] !d.-Property and Funds.-Insofar as church property and 
funds are concerned, a nonprofit church corporation may, 
through its directors, require an accounting to be made by 
the pastor. 
[12] !d.-Congregational Type.-A congregational type of church 
exists where each local group is in charge of all its affairs 
through majority vote of its members and there is no control 
from above. 
[13] !d.-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.-Where a re-
ligious society has no tribunal but the congregation, a court 
may determine whether the meeting at which a pastor was 
removed was properly conducted according to the usage, con-
tracts and rules of the society, or according to pertinent prin-
ciples of law if civil and property rights, such as emoluments 
of the position, are involved, and in so doing the court is not 
interfering with any ecclesiastical function. 
[14] !d.-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.-Generally a 
court will decide whether a meeting of a church body or its 
officers was properly called or conducted when civil or prop-
erty rights are involved. 
[15] !d.-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.-The superior 
court has jurisdiction to conduct a church election, through a 
referee appointed by such court, where a fair and proper elec-
tion cannot be conducted by the church and the election pre-
viously held was irregular and of no effect. 
[16] Id.- Internal Affairs- Jurisdiction of Courts.-Where the 
question presented is whether the property and funds of a 
church are being handled in accordance with the by-laws and 
[8] Determination by civil courts of property rights between 
contending factions of an independent church, notes, 8 A.L.R. 105; 
70 A.L.R. 75. See, also, Cal.Jur., Religious and Charitable Socie-
ties, § 13; Am.Jur., Religious Societies, § 41. 
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rules of the church corporation or such by-laws and rules arc 
being properly obsened by the governing body of the chmeli, 
those aggrieved may seek redress through court action. 
PHOCEEDIJ\'G i11 prohibition to rm;train thr, Supr-rior 
Court of thr Cit;' and Count? of Ran F'raneiseo from pro<:ee<l-
ing further in an aetion. ·writ denied. 
}<;dwanl D. Mabson for l'rtitiom~rs. 
,Joseph B. fsaa<·.s, Alan H. Criteher, Delany, I<'ishg-old & 
Minndri and .Joseph A. Murray for ReRpondent. 
CA H'I'EH, ;f.--Prohibition is sought to restrain further 
p1·oeeeding·s by respondent court in an action pending therein 
in which Proviclem~e Baptist Church of San Francisco, a 
nonprofit eorporatiou, and the trustees of the corporation arc 
plaintiffs and 1<'. B. Banks, the pastor of the church, is cle-
frndant. 
'l'he action is one for declaratory relief in which it was 
asserted by plaintiffs that defendant had been regularly and 
properly discharged as pastor of the church but refused to 
vanate the poRition and surrender documents and fnnds of 
t lw dmreb. 1 ssue wa~-; joined by defendant asserting that 
he . is the pa~-;tor of the church and rightfully holding his 
position. 
'l'he action was tried for 10 days before the court without 
a jury. Findings were made in which it was stated that the 
plaintiff church is a nonprofit corporation duly organized 
a1Hl the trustee:;; named were in 1950 the duly elected trustees 
of the corporation ; that prior to October 1, 1950, defendant 
was thr. pastor mrd spiritual leader of the church but that a 
resolution removing him, to become effective on October J, 
1 !1:)0, hafl been adopted by the trustees on September J 5. 
1050, a]J(l, at a meeting of the members of the congregation 
alHl corporation on September 16, 1950, a resolution had 
been adopted purporting to remove defendant as pastor as of 
October l, 1950; that in spite of the resolutions defendant re-
fused to nt<:atr' the position; that defendant and the secretary 
of the r.orporation bavP in their· possession funds of the dmrch 
a1Hl defPndant has made no report thereof except on Aep-
tPJnlwr G. l!HiO, and two years prior· thereto; that defendant 
has in his possession reeords of the corporation showing its 
af\sets but refm;es to deliver them to the trustees; that certain 
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described real property is owned by the corporation; that 
defendant claims but has no interest therein; that defendant 
organized the church on June 6, 1943, and it was incorporated 
on .Tuly 26, 1945, and defendant was pastor from the begin-
ning; that a "full, free and fair" election cannot be con-
ducted by defendant or the officers of the church and it is to 
its members' best i11terest that an election be held under the 
supervision of a court appointed referee to determine whether 
defendant shall be removed as pastor; that the articles of 
the corporation do not specify the number of trustees, but 
that there were three originally; that the only election of 
directors ever held was on August 21, 1950, when plaintiffs 
trustees (three of them) were elected and on September 9, 
1950, when two more were elected; that no by-laws have been 
adopted; that the commencement of the action was authorized 
by the trustees but the "church" employed no counsel to 
defend the action; that defendant is the pastor and spiritual 
leader of the church; and :finally, that a controversy exists 
and the court has jurisdiction. 
In its interlocutory judgment the court declared the mat-
ters so found and further declared : That the resolutions pur-
porting to remove defendant as pastor did not do so; that the 
trustees are entitled to the funds and records of the corpora-
tion; that a named referee is appointed to hold an election 
among all the members after due notice to determine whether 
defendant should be removed as pastor and a named referee 
is appointed to take an account to ascertain what defendant 
owes the corporation; and reserving jurisdiction to make such 
further orders as might be necessary when the referee's re-
ports were in. 
Defendant's counsel :filed notice of appeal from the inter-
locutory judgment on behalf of defendant and purportedly 
on behalf of the corporation, although as seen from the :find-
ings the corporation was a plaintiff in the action and repre-
sented by other counsel and the action was duly instituteil 
by the duly elected trustees of the corporation. That appeal 
was dismissed by the District Court of Appeal, First District, 
Division One, on October 22, 1951, on the grounds that the 
judgment was interlocutory and hence not appealable. (See 
Erickson v. Boothe, 35 Cal.2d 108 [216 P.2d 454] ; Lacey v. 
Bertone, 33 Cal.2d 649 f203 P.2d 755] ; Lyon v. Goss, 19 Cal. 
2d 659 [123 P.2d 11]; Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Ins. etc. 
Co., 77 Cal.App.2d 217 [175 P.2d 56].) 
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'Tho petition for prohibition names the corporation and 
defendant as petitioners and is verified by defendant and 
Irene Parker who asserts that she is the secretary of the cor-
poration. Counsel represents himself as attorney for de-
fendant and the corporation. Inasmuch as he was not counsel 
for the corporation in the main action (because the corpora-
tion was one of the plaintiffs in that action and he represented 
the defendant, and no substitution of attorneys appears) we 
will treat the petitioner here as being defendant in the action. 
In his petition, petitioner alleges the procedural events that 
have transpired and then proceeds with many factual allega-
tions such as: The existence of the corporation; that the church 
is a local independent entity owing no allegiance to any higher 
authority; that there are three directors of the corporation, 
of which petitioner is one and Irene Parker and Robert Fite 
are the others; that the form of the church is not congrega-
tional in that members have no voice in its government, since 
deacons are appointed by the pastor and they in turn choose 
and remove the pastor. The return to the petition asserts that 
the church has a congregational government. All of those 
things were presumably determined at the trial of the action 
and we do not have a transcript of the proceedings. Implicit 
in the findings and interlocutory judgment is the conclusion 
that the church is congregational in form and the members 
select the officers including the pastor. (1] Under such cir-
cumstances if it is decided, as it is later herein, that the court 
had jurisdiction to determine whether the church had followed 
the procedure established by its usage, custom, rules and regu-
1 at ions in respect to the pastor's position, then the court had 
jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly what those usages 
and regulations were and the judicial process should not be 
halted by prohibition. We take, therefore, the facts as ap-
pearing in the interlocutory judgment and findings. 
Preliminarily we have the question of whether a writ of 
prohibition is the appropriate remedy. [2, 3] Assuming 
that a jurisdictional question is presented (whether a court 
may adjudicate the issues presented which arise out of a 
church controversy), there is no appeal from the judgment 
entered because it is interlocutory and no appeal lies from 
the order appointing a referee (see Fallon v. Brittan, 84 Cal. 
511 [24 P. 381]; Gates v. Walker, 35 Cal. 289; 22 Cal.Jur. 
701), there still remains the question of whether an appeal 
from the final judgment after the reference is adequate, for 
of course an appeal lies from it. [4] Prohibition will not 
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issw~ when there is anoth<w adequate remedy. (C1:ty of San 
lhruo \'.Superior Conrf, ~~6 Ca1.2d 48:3 [224 P.2d 685].) There 
is still to lw had the refenn<~e h~· the nefer·ee to take an aecount 
and eonduet an eleetion, his rrport to the eourt, and its 
adjudication thereon. Petitioner claims as reasons why he 
will be injured by having those things done and an appeal 
thereafter taken, that he might lose the election and be re-
moved from his position. There is a serious obstacle to a re-
Yiew of the interlocutory judgment by the writ whieh peti-
tioner requests beeause there is nothing there to prohibit. 
The interlocutory judgment has been rendered and the referee 
appointed. [5] In general, a writ of prohibition issues only 
to prevent the commission of a future act and not to undo an 
act already performed. (Evans v. Superior Court, 14 Ca1.2d 
563 [96 P.2d 107]; 21 Cal.Jur. 581-583.) However, here 
things remain to be done, that is, the carrying out of the 
rderenees and the adjudication thereon. If there is no juris-
diction to conduct the eleetion there was none to make the 
interlocutory judgment. Hence the basic objections are to 
that judgment. While we do not have a transeript of the 
trial proeeedings leading to judgment yet we do have the 
findings and judgment. 
[6] It is the general rule "that the remedy in the ordinary 
eourse of law by an appeal from the judgment at the end 
of the trial is not aflequate when the court has no jurisdiction 
to proceed with the action and no appeal is available before 
final judgment. (Tomales Bay etc. Corp. v. Superior Court, 
:35 Cal.2d 389, 392 [217 P.2d 968].)" (City of San Diego v. 
Supen·or Court, s·upra, 36 Cal.2d 483, 485.) While here a 
partial trial has been had, there remain things to be done 
which would be injurious to petitioner. [7] "\¥here an 
order is not appealable, but is reviewable only upon appeal 
from a subsequent judgment, various factors, such as expense 
of proeeecling· with a trial and prejudice resulting from de-
lay, may operate to make that remedy inadequate." (Phelan 
v. Snperior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 370 [217 P.2d 951].) 
\Ve hold therefore that petitioner's remedy by appeal 
from the final judgment is not adequate. Hence prohibition is 
the proper remedy. 
vV e come, therefore, to the merits of the jurisdictional 
question. [8] As long as civil or property rights are in-
volved, the courts will entertain jurisdietion of controversies 
in religious bodies although some ecclesiastieal matters are 
im~iclentally involved. (Rosicnwian Fellowship v. Rosicrudan 
Dee. 1952] PROVIDENCE BAP'l'IST CHURCH v. SuPERIOR C•r. 61 
[ 40 C.2d 55; 251 P.2d 101 
Fellowship N on-Sectat·ian Church, 39 Cal.2d 121 [245 P.2d 
481] .) [9] That there are civil and property rights present 
is apparent from the findings and judg-ment. The real prop-
erty of the organization and funds collected are involved. 
Necessarily involved in the determination of who shall be 
pm;tor is the question of vvho shall receive the emoluments of 
the offiee, whieh presents a problem involving civil and prop-
t'l'ty rights. 
[10] Here we have a religious group incorporated under 
the nonprofit corporation law. Such a corporation may 
be formed for religious purposes. (Corp. Code, § 9200.) \V e 
may assume that the members of the corporation are members 
of the church, as such corporations contemplate membership 
(see Corp. Code, § § 9301, 9600-9611) and that its powers are 
exercised by a board of directors (see Corp. Code, § 9500). 
[11] Insofar as the church property and funds are con-
cerned, we can see no reason why the corporation, through 
its directors, cannot require an accounting to be made by 
the pastor. (See Bouldin v. Ale.rander, 103 U.S. 330 [26 
L.Ed. 308] .) 
\Vith respect to the pastor's compensation and, necessarily 
incidental thereto, who shall receive it and who shall hold 
the position, a somewhat different question is presented. The 
t•(mrt found that both the directors and members had passed 
n•Rolutions removing defendant; that these resolutions were 
not effective; and that a fair election among the members 
could not be held under the auspices of either the directors 
or defendant. These findings indicate that the members 
may exercise the po·wer of removal. So far as appears from 
the findings and judgment, there are no church tribunals 
whieh determine these questions. [12] Apparently the 
churrh iR the congregational type in which its affairs arc 
t·ontrol!f~d by the members. That type exists "where each 
local group is in eharge of <ill its affairR through majorit.'' 
\'of(~ of it,; members and there i.s no control from above." 
( Rosicr11cian P'ellowship v. Rosicrncian Pellowship Non-Ser?-
tarian ChuJ"ch, supra, 39 Cal.2d J 21, 133.) [13] Although 
there are cases seeming-l,v to the contrary (see 76 C.J.S., Re-
ligious Soeieties, § 89), it has been held that where a religious 
society has no tribunal but the congregation, a court may 
determine whether the meeting at which a pastor was re-
moved was properly conducted according to the ·usage, con-
tracts and rules of the society, or according to pertinent 
62 PRoVIDENCE BAPTIST CHURCH v. SuPERIOR CT. [40 C.2d 
principles of law where civil and property rights, such as 
the emoluments of the position, are involved, and that in 
so doing the court is not interfering with any ecclesiastical 
function. (See Dyer v. Superior Court, 94 Cal.App. 260 
[271 P. 113]; Longmeyer v. Payne, (Mo.App.) 205 S.W.2d 
263; Jennings v. Scarborough, 56 N.J.L. 401 [28 A. 559]; 
Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Congregation v. Hass, 177 
Wis. 23 [187 N.W. 677] ; Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 Har. & 
McH. (Md.) 429 [1 Am.Dec. 411] .) In the Dyer case, the 
court was concerned with whether the trial court had juris-
diction to decide what group in a church had the authority 
to discharge the pastor and, upon so determining, to ascer-
tain whether the proceedings for the discharge followed the 
established procedure. The court held that jurisdiction ex-
isted, stating (p. 268): "With this understanding of the 
church government it becomes apparent that the respondent 
court not only has jurisdiction to construe the provisions of 
the constitution which we have been considering, but also 
has jurisdiction to determine that the Los Angeles Associa-
tion of Congregational Churches and Ministers has withdrawn 
its fellowship from the petitioner and the effect of such 
action, as to whether it is final and conclusive, as well as 
its effect upon the petitioner .... It is proper, however, to 
call attention to the fact that our Supreme Court has definitely 
aligned itself with those authorities which hold that the civil 
authorities cannot disregard the decisions of the church tri-
bunals .... It also seems meet to say, in order to avoid sub-
sequent possible confusion, that Watson v. Jones, supra, 80 
U.S. [13 Wall.] 726, [20 L.Ed. 666] also quotes with approval 
from authorities to the effect that the supervisory power of 
the civil tribunals may not be invoked when the only prop-
erty involved is the loss of clerical office and the salary inci-
dent thereto. Having determined that the respondent court 
has the authority to determine what the ecclesiastical tribunal 
decided, it also follows that it has the jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether one who has been deprived of the fellowship 
of the Los Angeles Association of Congregational Churches 
and Ministers can or cannot act or claim to act as pastor of 
one of the units constituting the Los Angeles Association.'' 
In Maxwell v. Brougher, 99 Cal.App.2d 824 [222 P.2d 910], 
the court was considering the jurisdiction of the court to 
determine the manner in which the members and officers were 
to proceed in hearing and disposing of charges against the 
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pastor. Jurisdiction was denied but on the ground that the 
decision of a church tribunal on ecclesiastical matters is final 
rather than whether- the church had followed its rules. No 
consideration was given to the emoluments of the position. 
Here we have no such question. No church tribunal has 
properly and finally acted. We are holding that the court 
may determine whether the rules of the society have been 
followed and if they have not what will be the resulting 
effect on civil and property rights. 
[14] Generally a court will decide whether a meeting was 
properly called or conducted when civil or property rights 
are involved. (Trett v. Lambeth, (Mo.App.) 195 S.W.2d 524.) 
In regard to the conduct of an election by the congregation 
or other church body or its officers under a court decree it 
has been said: ''We do not mean that an election can never 
be called. If-for instance-a complaint should be filed stat-
ing that by force, threats, etc., the desire of the majority 
could not be ascertained, then a court could properly decree 
a clear election-not to decide the result of a pending case, 
but as granting the relief prayed, i.e., a clear election.'' 
(Elston v. Wilborn, 208 Ark. 377 [186 S.W.2d 662, 664, 
158 A.L.R. 179].) (See 31 L.R.A.N.S. 686.) An analogous 
principle is expressed in referring to shareholders' meetings 
in an ordinary corporation : ''The court may determine the 
person entitled to the office of director or may order a new 
election to be held or appointment to be made, and direct 
such other relief as may be just and proper.'' (Corp. Code, 
§ 2238.) That section is made applicable to nonprofit corpo-
rations. (Corp. Code, § 9002.) [15] While we may not 
be dealing with the officer of a corporation in the strict sense 
(the pastor of a church is involved) the situation is similar 
and we see no reason why an election cannot be conducted 
where, as appears, a fair and proper election cannot be con-
ducted by the church and the election previously held was 
irregular and of no effect. In other words the appropriate 
body of the church is assisted in acting within its proper 
sphere, according to its rules and regulations, to protect civil 
and property rights. If the problem was whether the pastor 
was preaching a theology contrary to the denominational doc-
trine or conducting religious services in a manner out of har-
, mony with the ritual of the church, it would clearly not be 
within the province of a court to interfere, and the controversy 
would have to be settled by the church tribunals. [16] But 
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where, as here, the question presented is whether the prop-
erty and funds of the church are being handled in accord-
ance with the by-laws and rules of the church corporation 
or sueh by-laws and rules are being pt'operly observed by 
the governing body of the cllllrch, those aggrieved may seek 
redress through court action. 
The petition for the writ of prohibition is denied and the 
alternative writ is discharged. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
EDlVIONDS, J.-Because, in my opinion, prohibition is not 
the proper remedy, 1 concur in the judgment denying the 
petition for the writ and discharging the alternative writ. 
'l'he principal objections in this proceeding are to the inter-
locutory judgment, which is not appealable. In effect, Banks 
seeks, and the majority permit, the writ to be used as a 
method of appeal from that judgment. As stated in the 
opinion, ''There is a serious obstacle to a review of the inter-
locutory judgment by the writ which petitioner requests be-
cause there is nothing there to prohibit.'' However, despite 
this difficulty, the basic issue is decided upon the merits 
without the benefit of any record on appeal or transcript 
of the evidence. Lacking these essentials to an adequate re-
view of the judgment, the majority are forced to assume 
most of the relevant facts and imply much of the remainder 
from the limited, and confusing, findings made by the trial 
court. It is impossible, from the few facts which appear, 
to determine whether the issue is correctly decided upon 
the merits. It well may be that the record, which is not be-
fore this court, would disclose judicial interference with de-
nmninational doctrine. 
The petitioner has not alleged any reasons why he will 
be injured by awaiting the final judgment, from which he 
may appeal. The trial has been completed and little re-
mJ1ins to be done before a final adjudication. For this reason, 
the general rule of inadequacy of an appeal after trial when 
the court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the action is 
not here applicable. The expenditure of time and money 
alone is not sufficient to render the remedy by appeal in- . 
adequate. (Jollie v. Super1:or Court, 38 Cal.2d 52, 56 [237 
P.2d 641] .) Apparently, the delay and expense to carry 
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the action to final judgment will be negligible in comparison 
to that already incurred. 
The real purpose of the present proceeding is to review 
a judgment from which no appeal lies, rather than to prevent 
the court from hearing and determining an action of which 
it does not have jurisdiction. The final judgment, from which 
an appeal will lie, obviously will be based upon issues of law 
and fact already determined by the interlocutory judgment. 
There is no showing that the petitioner will be prejudiced 
by awaiting his proper remedy by appeal. If that procedure 
were followed, this court would then have before it a record 
upon which to review the judgment. 
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied Janu-
ary 8, 1953. Edmonds, ,J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22511. In Bank. Dec. 17, 1952.] 
MANUEL S. MADRUGA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COUR'l' OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Shipping-Part Ownership of Vessels-Partition or Judicial 
Sale.-Federal Judicial Code, § 1333, as amended in 1949, 
declaring that federal district courts have original jurisdiction 
exclusive of state courts of any civil case or admiralty or 
maritime jurisdiction, "saving to suitors in all cases all other 
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled," authorizes a 
state court, in a partition proceeding instituted by a majority 
of the coowners of a vessel, to decree ownership interests, sale 
of the vessel, and distribution of the proceeds, at least where 
the granting of such relief does not conflict with the federal 
maritime policy that the majority owners determine the use 
and employment of the vessel. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of San Diego County from further proceedings in an 
action. vVrit denied. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Shipping, § 10; Am.Jur., Shipping, § 108. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Shipping, § 13. 
40 C.2d-3 
